

## BOOKS AND THE ARTS

*"Listen Yankee" Revisited*by Samuel Shapiro

CIA REFS., pp. 21, 24

"My loyalties are conditional upon my own convictions and my own values. . . . Both of these lie more with the Cuban revolution than with the official United States reaction to it. The policies the United States has pursued and is pursuing against Cuba are based upon a profound ignorance, and are shot through with hysteria. I believe that if they are continued they will result in more disgrace and more disaster for the image of my country before Cuba, before Latin America, and before the world."

— C. Wright Mills,  
*Listen Yankee* (1960)

Despite his successful academic career, C. Wright Mills did not fit the conventional pattern of a professor of sociology at a major American university. For one thing, his work was always intensely committed and personal; he shied away from foundation grants and association with research organizations that turn out studies of public opinion, marketing research, and similar directly useful subjects. For another, he was not content to mark out a small area within his discipline and spend his life mapping its boundaries and filling in details. And, finally, he never accepted the pleasing image of a righteous, prosperous, and conflict-free America that was a product of full employment in the academic profession during the 1950's. Instead, as the years went by and the Cold War continued, Mills grew more irreverent, more alienated, and more critical of the faults he saw in American society.

Mills' boldness, his concern for big problems and pivotal situations, and his willingness to take intellectual risks are all evident in *Listen Yankee*, the shortest and next to last of the eleven books he wrote or edited. As his critics were quick to point out, he lacked most of the usual qualifications requisite for

writing about the Cuban revolution. He had visited Latin America only briefly, in 1959 and 1960, knew little about the area's history or social structure, and had never visited Cuba before his brief tour in the summer of 1960. He did not speak Spanish, and allowed himself to be guided about the island by partisans of the revolution; he did not interview or obtain information from any *guajiros* (peasants) or workers, from opponents of Fidel, or from members of the PSP (Communist) hierarchy who were rising to key posts at the time of his arrival in Havana.

*Listen Yankee*, therefore, was not a cool and careful sociological study, but a polemic along the lines of *Common Sense* or *J'accuse*, an unusual and passionate statement to have come from an academician. Despite Mills' explanation that for the most part he was serving only as a spokesman for the revolutionaries, for "the hungry nation bloc [as] a voice that must be heard" by the American public, his book was pretty generally dismissed as a piece of *fidelist* propaganda:

"Mills is dishing out . . . the official Castro line; and . . . he expounds it with a mixture of bluster, revolutionary rhetoric, and downright falsehood which could not be improved on by Fidel himself" — Charles Rolo, *The Atlantic*, February, 1961.

"The book is . . . naïve in the extreme . . . or . . . purposefully designed to create a false impression about the . . . current situation in Cuba." — Kevin Corrigan, *Catholic World*, March, 1961.

"Tedious and repetitious, the book reads like translations of Castro's interminable and paranoiac brainwashing tirades against the United

States. It is replete with all the distortions and untruths . . . that have been printed in the Communist Party press for more than twenty-five years. . . . With absolutely no attempt at objectivity, Mills parrots these absurd accusations." — Jules Dubois, *The Saturday Review*, December 17, 1960.

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When *Harper's* published a chapter (December, 1960), its editors were careful to label it "a piece of propaganda — uncritical, emotional, oblivious of the faults of the Castro regime." Even periodicals like *Dissent* and *Encounter* were hostile to the argument of *Listen Yankee*; as Mills put it, in the last letter he wrote to me, "I expected to be beat on the head by the mass media, but I did not expect that the *entire* intelligentsia of this country would reveal so fully their moral cowardice."

Reading the book over again today, with the perspective derived from two more years' development of the Cuban revolution, it is possible to see that Mills *was* sometimes led astray by his informants, or at least did repeat inaccurate things which they told him. Since his book had such an extraordinary circulation (hundreds of thousands of copies in this country, 100,000 more in four editions in an authorized translation issued in Mexico, and at least one counterfeit edition published in Peru — all most unusual for a serious book about Latin America), it is worth pointing out some of the errors of fact which Mills did not correct or criticize:

*Listen, Yankee:*

*The middle classes "failed completely to do anything real about the Batista tyranny."*

Comment:

This is unfair to the thousands of middle-class Cubans who risked their lives in clandestine work in the cities, to such middle-class martyrs as José Antonio Echevarría, who led the attack on the Presidential Palace in 1957, to the 170 middle-class youths who took

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part in the assault on the Moncada barracks. Castro himself is of middle-class origin, the son of a well-to-do Oriente landlord, married for a time to the sister of a Batista official.

*What did you [Yankies] do - about the weapons, for example, the Yankee Government kept sending... to Batista?*

US arms shipments to Cuba, totaling less than \$11 million between 1945 and 1958, were doubtless an error. But these shipments were halted in March, 1958.

*Medical doctors are with and for the revolution.*

The Cuban Emergency Relief Center in Miami estimates that 1,300 of Cuba's 5,000 MD's had left the island by the end of 1961, and more continue to arrive in Miami every week.

*"We are already [August, 1960] beyond the point where [American economic pressure] could hurt us in any real way."*

On my most recent visit to Cuba, in August, 1962, the loss of \$600 million in imports from the US was painfully apparent; there were severe shortages of food and every kind of consumer goods. It is not at all clear if a viable economy can be built up relying on

markets and sources of supply that are 10,000 miles away.

*The Soviet countries are buying sugar. And that is because their standard of living is increasing. There is thus a rational economic relation between these Soviet countries and countries such as Cuba. . . . The greater demand in the world market will increase the price of sugar.*

Ernesto Guevara himself has pointed out that the USSR produces enough (beet) sugar of its own, and that it would be cheaper for the Russians to increase production at home rather than rely on Cuba's antiquated and inefficient industry. And despite a disastrous 1962 Cuban crop of only 4.8 million tons (which was exceeded as far back as 1925), the world price of sugar has been hovering at about 3 cents a pound all year.

*Ours is the first agrarian reform in the world which began right away with an increased production. . . . For the first time in the history of Cuba, the rural population is going to have plenty of good clean chicken to eat at a price they can afford. . . . By December, 1960, we figure we'll have about 60 (state) farms, producing some 6 million chickens a month; in 1961, we'll double that.*

INRA's figures, like those issued by the Chinese during their Great Leap Forward, are quite unreliable. There has been some increase in production of food in items like rice and beans. But the agrarian reform has so far been unable to make up for the \$180 million in food normally imported from the US. Rice, beans, fish, eggs, meat, milk, butter, and most other foods are tightly rationed. As for chickens, Cubans are entitled to only one a month, and don't always get it. Castro's most recent statement is that Cuba is producing only 2 million chickens a month, "and will double that in 1963." - Speech to the Federation of Cuban Women, *El Mundo*, October 3, 1962.

*"Next year - 1961 - we are going to have a one million ton steel plant."*

No such plant is currently in operation, or even under construction. Even Professor J. P. Morray, an enthusiastic defender of the regime, estimates that steel production will be only 250,000 tons in 1965. - "Cuba and Communism," *Monthly Review*, July-August 1961.

*Our Prime Minister went to Washington right after the insurrection, but he was just given the cold shoulder, and certainly no help. Even his request for quite minor financial consideration was turned down flat.*

This bit of fidelista mythology has been refuted by Felipe Pazos, Castro's first National Bank President, and by Rufo Lopez Fresquet, his Minister of Finance. They accompanied Fidel to the US in 1959, and have reported their surprise and disappointment when he specifically ordered them not to ask for American help. - Daniel James, *Cuba: The First Soviet Satellite in the Americas* (New York, 1961)

*We Cuban revolutionaries of the 26th of July Movement are much more advanced than the Communist Party ever was or is today. . . . We are using them rather than the reverse. . . . The Communists as a political party have very little importance in Cuba.*

Even in the summer of 1960, when Mills visited Cuba, PSP (Communist) influence was considerable and growing. By 1962, INRA, Havana University, the trade union federation (CTC-

## Another Dream Song

Filling her compact and delicious body  
with chicken paprika, she glanced at me  
twice.

Fainting with interest, I hungered back  
and only the fact of her husband and four other people  
kept me from springing on her

or falling at her little feet and crying  
"You are the hottest one for years of night  
Henry's dazed eyes  
have enjoyed, brilliance." I advanced upon  
(despairing) my spumoni. - Sir Bones: is stuffed,  
de world, wif feeding girls.

- Black hair, complexion latin, jewelled eyes  
downcast . . . The slob beside her feasts . . . What wonders is  
she sitting on, over there?  
The restaurant buzzes. She might as well be on Mars.  
Where did it all go wrong? There ought to be a law against Henry.  
- Mr. Bones: there is.

JOHN BERRYMAN

R), the only legal political party, and the largest newspaper were all headed by "old militants," and the Union of Young Communists (UJC) had clearly become the road to future influence.

*"We Cubans aren't afraid of any idea; so we are going to be really free. . . . We believe that minorities should have the means of expressing their opinions."*

Cuban newspapers, the university, the schools, the publishing business, and all the organs of intellectual life are anything but "really free" at the present time. Mills' informant could argue that it is American pressure that has led to the clamping-down on free discussion.

*Listen Yankee* says nothing about Castro's promise to restore the 1940 constitution, his pledge of "genuine representative government" and "truly honest elections," his guarantee of "just compensation of expropriated owners" of land to be turned over to small holders. Theodore Draper, Castro's ablest American critic, has shown quite clearly (in *Castro's Revolution: Myths and Realities*) that *el líder máximo* promised one kind of revolution, and delivered quite another.

*Listen Yankee* might seem, therefore, to have only the limited value of telling us what Cuban revolutionaries were thinking and saying in the summer of 1960. Even Draper admits that it is a "peculiarly useful and exasperating work" on this score, so faithful a record that he was able to guess at the names of many of Mills' informants.

"Catching superbly the color, flavor, and intensity of the revolutionary thinking and emotion, [Mills] has presented with fine accuracy what Castro and his friends think and what makes them act the way they have been acting toward the United States. . . . The author has been eminently successful in putting across this 'voice of the Cuban revolution.'"—Tad Szulc in *The New York Times*, December 4, 1960.

But if the book were no more than an honest and intelligent piece of journalism, it could be regarded as only an interesting but unimportant footnote to Mills' scholarly career.

The basic argument of *Listen Yankee*, however, like the Cuban revolution itself, cannot be dismissed so easily. Despite errors of fact that were doubtless inevitable in a book produced in such haste, Mills also noted down a great many truths about the revolution, truths which the American people and their leaders have not been able to bring themselves to recognize even yet. On re-reading the book in Cuba during the summer of 1962, I was surprised to see that much of what Mills wrote still seemed applicable, even after two years of continuing cataclysmic change. To compensate for the brevity of Mills' Latin American experience, he had the advantages of a gifted observer's eye, an understanding of the process of social change, a familiarity with radical thought, and a sympathetic sociological imagination to help him interpret the revolution. He made many errors, but on a number of crucial issues he was right, and far more experienced Latin American scholars and journalists wrong; and it is important for us to understand why.

To begin with, Mills made the most of the weeks he spent in Cuba. Before arriving in Havana he read everything he could on the island's recent history, including US Commerce Department reports on sugar and the International Bank for Reconstruction's surveys of the economy. While his contacts were limited to middle-class intellectuals, he did travel from one end of the island to the other, and interviewed many of the men who are still running the revolution: President Osvaldo Dorticos, Education Minister Armando Hart, Ernesto Guevara, then head of the National Bank and now Minister of Industry, Carlos Franqui, editor of *Revolución*, Major René Vallejo, INRA chief of Oriente province, and others. And he knew how to make the most of these meetings. Robert Taber, himself an experienced reporter formerly with NBC, wrote me last July that Mills

"... was the most thorough, penetrating, and all-round best interviewer I've ever seen, including any journalist you'd care to mention, and most psychiatrists. . . . When he got through, subject and he were both wrung dry, he because of remarkably intense concentration, watching subject like a hawk for every ex-

pression. In the end he knew a lot more about the subject than the subject did, of that I'm sure. It was a pleasure and wonder to watch him work."

Putting together what he was told and what he saw, Mills concluded that the revolution had accomplished many needed reforms, that it was popular with a majority of the Cuban people, and that it was permanent, i.e., could not be destroyed by outside pressures. In view of the subsequent unsuccessful invasion of the island by a US-backed group of Cuban exiles, it is clear that President Kennedy would have done well to listen to Mills' informants:

"Your government is dreaming of some kind of indirect military action, secretly supported mercenaries and Batista henchmen; something like they did in Guatemala a while back. . . . But the ending isn't going to be the same, we can assure you of that. It won't work again. . . . We will not flee the country as Batista did. We are determined to fight to the end. Any one who is here in Cuba for just a little while sees clearly that this is just a fact."

This was in print while American newspapers prated about Castro's "hysterical" talk of an invasion, and even before Professor Ronald Hilton of Stanford University revealed the existence of an American base at Retalhuleu in Guatemala. On the danger of an invasion and its probable failure, Mills was correctly informed, and the mass media, the CIA, the joint Chiefs of Staff, and the President of the United States were not. Plenty of Latin American experts, with vastly more knowledge of Cuban affairs than Mills, insisted, and still insist, that Castro can be overthrown and the old pattern of American domination of the island resumed.

"I have the feeling that economic pressures will make Fidel Castro unpopular in the long run. . . . When things hit bottom, the United States will lend \$500 million to a new Cuban Government on the pledge that the confiscated properties will be returned or the former owners indemnified. American capital will re-enter Cuba."—Daniel M. Frieden-

berg, "History Will Not Absolve Castro," *The New Republic*, October 10, 1960.

"To remain in power, Castro will have to massacre most of the country's 6.5 million people." — Jules Dubois, *The Pontiac Press*, November 11, 1961.

People who write this way, as Mills pointed out, simply do not understand revolutions. We can, as Senator Engle of California has engagingly suggested, "take the top six feet off of all of Cuba with one air strike, and all that's built on it, and all that live on it." But we cannot reverse a social revolution and restore the old order of things in Cuba.

Another theme of *Listen Yankee* was Mills' insistence on Castro's humanitarian goals and achievements. On my own visits to the island in 1960, 1960-61, and 1962, I saw continuing evidence of concern for the immediate welfare and future well-being of what had formerly been the despised lower classes. Indeed, the Communist technicians from Eastern Europe I interviewed in Cuba usually criticized the regime

because it was too easy-going, too consumption-oriented, too committed to such "impractical" projects as housing, hotels, and tourism — "not enough work and too much cha-cha-cha."

No one can deny that the press in Cuba today is muzzled, that the trade unions are becoming organs of the state for enforcing production goals, and that grave injustices have been and are being committed by a small group of men with absolute power. Nevertheless, the positive social accomplishments of the past four years have won continuing support for Castro from what I believe is still a substantial majority of the Cuban people. It would be easy but meaningless to present testimony to that effect by such uncritical eulogists of the regime as Leo Huberman, Paul Sweezy, and Professor Morray. But consider the following observations, all of them supporting Mills' view, and all of them written by men whose attitude toward Castro ranges from mildly critical to bitterly hostile:

1960

"No matter what one may think of the theory behind Cuba's land-reform program and no matter how

the program turns out in practice, there is no getting around the fact that for the poor, illiterate, landless, outcast guajiros, the cooperatives represent a jump of centuries in living standards. They also represent a vast increase of constructive activity in the rural areas that were formerly the most backward and stagnant part of Cuba. . . . For the first time in Cuban history a leader has given [the peasants] a sense of human dignity and political importance, and they have paid him back by revering him." — Theodore Draper, "The Runaway Revolution," *The Reporter*, May 12, 1960.

"I'm one hundred percent better. Before, there was not work. Now there's work all year. Now we are eating — rice, eggs, beans. . . . If this is Communism, let it come." — An unidentified cooperative farmer in Pinar del Rio, quoted in *Time*, June 20, 1960.

"Seven thousand new school classrooms have been completed this year. . . . Uncounted millions have been spent on the building of public beaches and tourist facilities — a pet project of Dr. Castro — leading even some of the Premier's most devoted followers to wonder about his system of revolutionary priorities." — Tad Szulc, *The New York Times*, August 3, 1960.

"No less than 86 percent of our sample did approve of the present situation in Cuba and . . . one half of these . . . revealed themselves as really fervent supporters of the present government. . . . We feel reasonably confident in predicting that, had a national election been held at the time of our survey, Fidel Castro would have won by overwhelming odds." — Lloyd A. Free, *Attitudes of the Cuban People Toward the Castro Regime* (Princeton, 1961).

"The story of the transformation of Cuba from a friendly ally to a Communist base is — in large measure — the story of a government in Washington which lacked the imagination and compassion to understand the needs of the Cuban people." — Senator John F. Kennedy, in a speech of October 6, 1960, reprinted in *In-*

## Enrico's Brother

Enrico's brother married a strange lady,  
the Earth, no other bride he needed; she labored,  
brought forth fine sapling children; he laughed at times  
and offered firm red apples to his friends:  
"My grandchild this," he'd say, "this saucy redhead;  
or this blond fellow with the pointed head,"  
pointing a pear.

Enrico's brother's heart  
tired suddenly one sunny morning  
as he was sawing for his winter reading.

They gave him a harp. He had never favored the harp  
and played it awkwardly. They taught him songs  
and this was more to his liking. He was maker of songs  
in his Earth-love days.

But after a million years  
of tingling the harp and singing and singing the songs  
and watching the myriad myriad newcomers come,  
Enrico's brother sought and asked the officials:  
"How are my children in that lovely place?"  
The officials were friendly enough, they studied the charts;  
at last and slowly they turned their haloed heads  
and spoke as one: "It seems to be gone," they said.

JOHN RUSSELL MCCARTHY

ter-American Economics Affairs,  
Winter, 1961.

1961

"The agrarian reform program, the heart of the original revolution, is, to use the most reticent adjective, a splendid piece of work... undoubtedly a success in the improvement of people as well as of statistics... What is most impressive... is the change made by the revolution in people's attitude to life." - "Cuba in Mid-Revolution," *The Economist* (London), January 7, 1961.

"The Fidelist government does have achievements to point to. In the course of a short two years it has built thousands of first-rate schools; it has led an intense (and remarkably successful) campaign to eradicate illiteracy; it has constructed rural settlements which, for the first time, offer modern, sane and even comfortable housing to a growing number of its *cooperativistas*. ... A strong majority of the rural population still seems willing to follow Castro's lead." - F. R. Alleman, *Forum Service*, February 11, 1961.

"Castro and Guevara are literally adored... by the large number of poor and humiliated Cubans, especially the Negroes. They see these two leaders as saintly and honorable men, dedicated to removing injustices and discrimination, to which the Cuban Negroes had been subjected." - Joseph Newman, *The New York Herald Tribune*, March 23, 1961.

"If Castro has enough time and money to create a higher standard of living among the peasants as a result of this truly revolutionary [land reform program] he will go down in Cuban history as a greater patriot than José Martí. ... Not merely for propaganda purposes... but because it is deeply and sincerely believed, the Cuban regime emphasizes that justice and dignity are for the poor and small and colored as well as the rich and big and white. ... Almost all the peasants still support Castro, as do the very poor and the Negroes in the city population. The intellectuals are without doubt in his camp." - Daniel M. Friedenberg, "A

Journey to Cuba," *Dissent*, Summer, 1961.

"The concrete cubes of peasant houses, with electricity and running water, are replacing the former squalor of palm leaf thatched huts. ... Living standards are rising and unemployment is dwindling." - Tad Szulc, *The New York Times*, June 25, 1961.

1962

"The explanations offered for Castro's failure to hold elections are on the whole reasonable. The Revolution has been unquestionably popular with a large majority of the Cuban people, and few revolutionary governments... have held elections until considerable time elapsed after they came to power." - Dennis H. Wrong, "The American Left and Cuba," *Commentary*, February, 1962.

"Though greatly diminished, the reservoir of idealism and expectancy that Castro began with still exists among many *campesinos*." - *Time*, April 27, 1962.

"Cubans partial to the revolution... take pride in modern housing developments that have sprung up, mainly on palm-dotted fields but also around several cities. In Havana... they will point at the East Havana suburb, with its up-to-date apartment buildings etched on the bright horizon. Rolling through the countryside, one sees acres of small concrete-and-brick homes, designed to replace miserable huts." - AP dispatches printed in *The New York Times*, June 10 and June 13, 1962.

"The eradication of prostitution and gambling (much of it controlled by US gangsters), the quick social reforms - these made a deep impression on all those in Latin America who had been hoping for progress in their own countries. ... Castroism still represents a formidable rallying point for Latin America's destitute masses." - George N. Fenin, "Democracy's Last Chance in Latin America," *The Saturday Review*, August 18, 1962.

"Low cost modern housing, replacing wretched slums, has benefited

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thousands of Cuban families. So has the health program. Clinics have been established throughout the countryside, and medicine has reached some remote areas for the first time. . . . Giant strides have also been made in education. . . . More Cubans are eating more regularly than was true in pre-Castro days. No report on Cuba pretending to a reasonable degree of objectivity can avoid the judgment that Castro's regime has achieved significant gains for its people in the realm of social service." - Donald Grant, "Castro's Cuba Today," *The Progressive*, September, 1962.

These reports, and others like them, should not of course lead us to any blanket endorsement of a totalitarian regime; similar stories regularly came out of Mussolini's Italy, Stalin's Russia, and Hitler's Germany. Castro's dictatorship could become a brutal tyranny. Mills himself was aware of this, and frank in expressing his fears:

"I do not like such dependence upon one man as exists in Cuba today, nor the virtually absolute power that this one man possesses. . . . Any moment of such military and economic truth might become an epoch of political and cultural lies. It might harden into any one of several kinds of dictatorial tyranny."

#### NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Samuel Shapiro, the author of numerous controversial articles about US policy in Latin America, has just lost his job. He is an assistant professor of American history at Michigan State University. The Detroit Free Press charges that the issue of academic freedom was raised by his dismissal, and students have set up a committee for his reinstatement. Dr. Shapiro's article is drawn from a forthcoming volume: *The New Sociology: Essays on Social Theory and Social Values in Honor of C. Wright Mills*, edited by Irving L. Horowitz. John Berryman, a member of the English faculty at Brown University, has published several books of poems. John Russell McCarthy, a California poet, makes his first New Republic appearance with this issue.

But the United States, Mills argued, could only exacerbate the problem and drive Fidel to tyranny by continuing its hostile attitude toward his regime. Repeated statements by American officials that "Communism in this hemisphere is not negotiable" (Adlai Stevenson), and that "we do not recognize the Castro regime in Cuba, and never will" (Douglas Dillon), are fine for home consumption, but hardly the basis for a viable Caribbean policy. With the Alliance for Progress so far an admitted failure, *fidelismo* is still what Mills said it was, a major alternative to . . . misery elsewhere in Latin America."

The intellectuals in President Kennedy's entourage have tried to brush aside Mills' assertion (in *The Power Elite* and *The Causes of World War III*) that a small group of men with vested interests controlled American domestic and foreign policy, and that they based their rule on "violence and . . . inept opportunism." But it remains for them to explain why the Cuban policy pursued during the last two years of the Eisenhower Administration and the first two years of the New Frontier fell into such a monolithic pattern. Eisenhower cut off the Cuban sugar quota; Kennedy shut off the last trickle of trade. Eisenhower broke relations; Kennedy kept our embassy in Havana shut. Eisenhower authorized the training of a band of anti-Castro refugees by the CIA; Kennedy sent them ashore in the Bay of Pigs. The faces (except for the ever-present head of the FBI) change. Eisenhower, the Dulles brothers, and Sherman Adams are replaced by the Kennedys, McCone, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. and McGeorge Bundy. But our Cuban policy remains the same. This would be understandable, perhaps, if that policy were successful. But our hostility has so far succeeded only in driving Fidel further into the Soviet camp; his first official announcement that his was a "Socialist" revolution came immediately after our tragicomic invasion of April, 1961. As Mills warned, State Department and CIA policymakers have brought about what they most feared - the intrusion of Russian Communism in the Caribbean.

Mills' basic conclusions about Castro, then, have not yet been proved wrong. He felt also that the inadequate American reaction to *fidelismo* was symptomatic, that "on the shores of Cuba the

whole international posture of the United States of America has . . . collapsed in utter failure." Even before Kennedy's election Mills predicted the attempted invasion, the unsuccessful Alianza, and the inability of the new Administration to deviate in any essential way from the policies of the old in Latin America: "You're coming up against the economic and political structure of the United States."

Re-read in this light, *Listen Yankee* fits into Mills' thought as a significant part of its structure. Here, he believed, was a possible escape from the sterile formulas of the past, from the warfare between impotent liberalism and vulgarized Marxism. The Cuban revolution, he thought, was a new and independent movement, with a great deal of promise in opening a new road to socialism, one free of the dogmatism and sectarianism of orthodox Communist movements elsewhere. During the last year of his life he hoped to return to Cuba to see how the revolution was progressing, and perhaps to begin a broadly based study of what he regarded as one of the most promising social experiments of the 1960's. And it was fitting that his last book, devoted to a consideration of the varieties of Marxism, should have concluded with Ernesto Guevara's "Notes for the Study of the Ideology of the Cuban Revolution." I can similarly end with some of the advice that Mills hoped we would listen to before it was too late:

"No matter what you believe about Communism, there is only one way you can counter it. You must begin really to compete with that influence in positive, constructive ways. And that can only mean in technical and cultural and economic and political ways. If you really tried, perhaps you might win. . . . Cuba is your big chance. It's your chance to establish once again what the United States perhaps did once mean to the world. It's your chance to make it clear how you're going to respond to all the chaos and tumult and glory, all the revolution and bloody mess and enormous hopes that are coming about among all the impoverished, disease-ridden, illiterate, hungry peoples of the world in which you, Yankee, are getting so fat and drowsy."